Cryptographic Enhancement of Named Pipes for Secure Process Communication

Abstract

This study aims to enhance cryptographic security within the "named pipe" Inter-Process Communication (IPC) method utilized in Unix and Unix-like systems. Addressing security vulnerabilities inherent in the named pipe structure, this research endeavors to augment IPC security by integrating a cryptographic layer using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption algorithm with 128-bit length key. The named pipe structure allows all processes specified by the owner or group to access data within the pipe. This implies the potential for processes generated by malicious software to access this data. By integrating a cryptographic secure communication structure into this bidirectional, readily applicable method, this study seeks to fortify the protocol. Technical objectives of this research involve encrypting messages with the AES-128 algorithm, enabling meaningful decryption of messages written with the same algorithm, and preventing interpretation of messages within the pipe by third-party processes lacking this cryptographic structure. Experimental findings showcase that when monitored by a process lacking this cryptographic structure, encrypted and incomprehensible messages are displayed, indicating the resistance of the encrypted structure against external interventions. In conclusion, this study introduces a new method to enhance security in IPC by adding a cryptographic security layer to the named pipe. This research may have implications for IPC security in Unix systems and could be applicable to other IPC methods facing similar security vulnerabilities.